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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is brought by the crossclaimant-appellant, 
Reid Swapp, also known as Reid Swapp Construction Company, 
(hereinafter referred to as "SWAPP") from an Order of the Third 
Judicial District Court denying his Motion to Set Aside a 
Default Judgment entered against him on July 1, 1981, by 
Tanglewood SLC Associates, (hereinafter referred to as "TANGLE-
WOOD"), crossclaimant-respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, The Honorable Hal Taylor, District Judge, presiding, 
denied Swapp's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment entered 
against him by Tanglewood on July 1, 1981. The Motion was 
predicated upon Affidavits on file with the Court and pursuant 
to Rule 60(b)(l) and (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Motion was denied because: 
(1) According to the Court, it was grounded upon a 
claim of "negligence" of Swapp's former attorney, which "negli-
gence" the Court reasoned, was imputable to Swapp, and 
(2) Be~ause Swapp failed to bring his Motion within 
the three months of the entry of Judgment as provided by Rule 
60(b). (See transcript of hearing, page 7, lines 18-21.) 
-1-
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RELIEF BEING SOUGHT 
Crossclaimant-appellant Swapp appeals to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah for a reversal of the lower Court's 
Order denying Swapp's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment 
on grounds that the lower Court erred as follows: 
(1) It erroneously characterized the flagrant mis~ 
conduct of Swapp's previous attorney as "negligence"; 
(2) It erroneously imputed that impropriety to Swapp; 
(3) It erroneously applied to the circumstances of 
this case Rule 60(b)(l) complete with its three month limita~ 
tion; 
(4) It failed to properly characterize Swapp's 
former attorney's conduct as withdrawal without notice or 
abandonment, which amounts to impropriety that cannot be 
imputed to Swapp and which is remediable under Rule 60(b)(7), 
for which the three month deadline is not applicable; 
(5) In failing to exercise its legal discretion 
according to well-established precedent, the Court abused its 
discretion; 
(6) That since the Order of the Court denying the 
setting aside of the Default was not made within the sound 
legal discretion of the Court, but by an abuse thereof, the 
Order denying Swapp's Motion should be reversed, the Default 
Judgment set aside, and the Execution predicated thereon 
declared a nullity. 
-2-
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FACTS OF THE CASE 
On or about June 9, 1980, plaintiff Gardiner & 
Gardiner Builders, et al., filed a Complaint against, inter alia 
Reid Swapp a/k/a Reid Swapp Construction Company, and Tangle-
wood SLC, Ltd. 
Shortly thereafter Swapp retained Steven D. Luster, 
a member of the Utah State Bar, whose offices are located in 
Salt Lake City, to represent Swapp in this lawsuit. 
On or about July 21, 1980, Swapp, by and through his 
attorney of record, Steven D. Luster, filed both his Answer 
to plaintiff's Complaint and his Crossclaim against Tanglewood. 
On or about December 16, 1980, Tanglewood filed its 
Answer to Swapp's Crossclaim. 
On or about January 21, 1981, Tanglewood filed a 
Crossclaim against Swapp. 
At this point the original plaintiff was substituted 
by a plaintiff in intervention, David L. Richie d/b/a Richie 
Construction Company, (hereinafter referred to as "RICHIE"). 
On February 19, 1981, Swapp filed his Answer to 
Tanglewood's Crossclaim. 
At this point what the lower Court characterized as 
the "negligence" of Swapp's attorney commenced. 
On or about April 2, 1981, Richie served Swapp's 
attorney with Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Documents. Swapp's attorney never notified Swapp that these 
documents had been served or that Swapp was legally obligated 
to respond to them. 
-3-
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On or about May 8, 1981, Tanglewood served upon Swapp's 
attorney -a set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Documents; and again Swapp's attorney failed to inform Swapp that 
these documents had been served or of Swapp•s obligation to 
respond thereto. 
On or about June 10, 1981, Swappis attorney, without 
Swapp's knowledge or consen~ stipulated with Tanglewood to respond 
to Tanglewood's May 8, 1981, discovery papers by June 17, 1981. 
But Swapp's attorney did not inform Swapp of this committment, nor 
did he meet this deadline. 
On or about June 10, 1981, Tanglewood served upon Swapp' 
attorney a Notice of Deposition requiring Swapp'' s attendance at 
the offices of Tanglewood'· s attorneys on June 30, 1981, at 9: 30 
a.m. Swapp's attorney failed to inform Swapp of the fact and 
details of this deposition; consequently, Swapp did not attend. 
On or about June 19 1 1981, Tangle",rn.od made a Motion 
To Compel Swapp to respond to their discovery request. Once 
again_, Swapp' s attorney told Swapp nothing about these papers 
or their legal significance. 
On June 30, 1981, Tanglewood moved the lower Court to 
strike Swapp's pleadings. Swapp's attorney did not inform Swapp 
of this Motion, nor did he respond to it. 
On July 1, 1981, Tanglewood entered its Default against 
Swapp. Swapp's attorney did not inform him of this fact either. 
-4-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Swapp first became aware of his dilemma on or about 
October 1, 1981, only after receiving Execution papers on his 
wife's real property. As soon as possible, Swapp enlisted the 
aid of his present attorneys, who moved to set aside the Default 
Judgment. That Motion was denied and Swapp makes this appeal. 
I 
The aforementioned facts are a matter of record with 
the Court and part of the Transcript on Appeal. The pertinent 
facts were also set forth in the Affidavit of Reid Swapp 
accompanying his Motion To Set Aside the Default Judgment, 
the denial of which forms the basis of this Appeal. It is 
to be noted that the facts set forth in that Affidavit were 
virtually uncontroverted by any answering Affidavits~ 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO SET ASIDE A 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS APPEALABLE. 
In the case of Blyth & Fargo Co. v. Swenson, 15 U. 
345, 59 P. 1027 at 1028 (1897), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that: "An Order denying a Motion to set aside a judgment . 
must be regarded as a final judgment and appealable." Under 
this Rule, the Order of the Third Judicial District Court 
denying Swapp's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment is 
an appealable Order under Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure which provides that "An appeal may be taken to the 
Supreme Court from all final orders and judgments . . " 
-5-
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POINT II 
DENIAL OF A MOTION TO SET ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDG-
MENT WILL BE REVERSED IF THE ORDER IS NOT HADE 
IN THE SOUND LEGAL DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
In the case of Utah Commercial & Savings Bank v. 
Trumbo, 17 U. 198, 53 P. 1033 at 1036 (1898), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that: " ... the setting aside of a judgment by 
default rests within the sound legal discretion of the Court, 
and the appellate Court will not interfere; but, where, as in 
this case, it is made clearly to appear that there was such an 
abuse of discretion, through inadvertence or otherwise, as to 
render the action erroneous and unlawful, the appellate Court 
will control such discretion, and set aside the illegal action. 
Such discretion does not confer upon the Court an arbitrary 
power beyond that of review. It is an impartial legal signi-
ficance, which cannot be employed to the injury of any subject, 
but must be exercised fairly, reasonably, and in accordance 
with established principals of law." 
Swapp here argues that the Order denying his Motion 
to set aside the Default Judgment was not made in the sound 
legal discretion of the Third Judicial District Court because, 
as shall hereafter be argued more fully, the weight of legal 
authority requires the setting aside of such a Judgment when 
it is shown that the Judgment was entered against the defendant 
because of his attorney's abandoning or withdrawing from his 
case without notice. Because the Court acted without sound 
-6-
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legal discretion, the trial court's Order is subject to review 
and reversal by the Supreme Court. 
POINT III 
SOUND LEGAL DISCRETION REQUIRES THE COURT TO 
RULE FAIRLY AND JUSTLY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
While there is a need to achieve finality in litiga-
tion, judicial discretion must not achieve that end in disregard 
of what is right and equitable under the circumstances in a 
particular case. "Each case must ... depend upon its own 
peculiar facts and circumstances." Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 
855 at 858 (1979). 
"The Trial Court must balance two valid considerations; 
on the one hand, to relieve the party of the Judgment vitiates 
the effect of res judicata and creates a hardship for the 
successful litigant by causing him to prosecute more than 
once his action and subjecting him to the possible loss of 
collecting his Judgment. On the other hand, the Court desires 
to protect the losing part who has not had the opportunity 
to present his claim or defense." Airkem Intermountain, Inc. 
v. Parker, 30 U.2d 65, at 67-68, 513 P.2d 429 at 431 (1973). 
Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant 
Swapp has been burdened with a Default Judgment against him 
personally in excess of $80,000.00 simply because he was not 
aware that his attorney had abandoned him. No weight was given 
by the trial court to the fact that Tanglewood would not be 
-7-
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unduly prejudiced if the Judgment were set aside, or to the 
fact that Swapp had filed his Answer & Crossclaim against 
Tanglewood and was attempting to litigate his rights, or to 
the fact that immediately upon his realizing his dilemma, 
-Swapp retained new counsel to assist him to reassert his rights. 
The Court denied Swapp's Motion without regard to the circum-
stances, thereby further blackening Swapp's already dismal 
opinion of the workings of the justice system. 
The Supreme Court in Trumbo, supra, fairly pointed 
out that "a judge must have due regard to what is just and 
fair under existing circumstances and that he not act in an 
arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable manner," Id at 1036. 
The Court further stated that "the power of the (trial] court 
to set aside judgments . should be liqerally exercised, 
for the purpose of directing proceedings and trying causes 
upon their substantial merit; and where the circumstances 
which ,lead to the default are such as to cause the Court to 
hesitate, it is better to resolve a doubt in favor of the 
application so that a trial may be secured on the merits" Id. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ABUSES ITS DISCRETION IF IT FAILS 
TO SET ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN CIRCUMSTANCES 
SIMILAR TO THOSE PRESENTED BY THE INSTANT CASE. 
The trial court should set aside a default judgment 
whenever the defaulted party can show: 
-8-
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defend; 
(1) A reasonable excuse for his non-appearance; 
(2) That he used due diligence in attempting to 
(3) That he was prevented from appearing by circum-
stances over which he had no control; 
(4) That the non-defaulting party will not be unduly 
prejudiced by the setting aside of the judgment; and 
(5) That the defaulting party has a meritorious 
defense. 
In Heath v. Mower, supra, this Court held that a 
defendant who failed to provide a "reasonable excuse for his 
non-appearance" should not be relieved from his judgment. The 
implication being that the presentation of a reasonable excuse 
would entitle him to relief. Furthermore, In Airkem Inter-
mountain, Inc., v. Parker, supra, this Court required that a 
party, to obtain relief from a Judgment, "must show that he has 
used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing 
by circumstances over which he had no control." 
In cases decided in neighboring jurisdictions, the 
further showing that the non-defaulting party would not be 
unduly prejudiced and that the defaulting party have a meritor-
ious defense have both been required. See Buckert v. Briggs, 
15 Cal. App. 3d 296, 93 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971), and St. Vrain 
Development Co., v. F. & S. Development Co., 470 P.2d 49 
(Colo., 1970). 
-9-
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In the present case Swapp had a reasonable excuse for 
his non-appearance to Tanglewood's discovery request; and had 
used due diligence in retaining an attorney, but was prejudiced 
by his attorney'·s failure--complete failure--to communicate 
with him. Swapp's non-responsiveness was due to circumstances 
over which he had no control, for he continued to contact his 
attorney, but received no word from counsel with regard to the 
progress of his case or his obligations to answer pleadings 
filed therein. Swapp did his best to defend, but was hindered 
by the inexcusable inpropriety and misconduct of his attorney. 
That he had a meritorious defense is clear from the record, 
and that Tanglewood would not have been prejudiced by the 
setting aside of the default judgment is also clear. 
Under these circumstances, the Default should have 
been set aside. According to this Court's holding in Board 
of Education of the Granite School District v. Cox, 14 U.2d 
385, 384 P.2d 806 at 807 (1963), "it is an abuse of discretion 
to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable 
justification for· the defendant's failure to appear and answer." 
In another case, this Court observed that "to clamp 
a judgment rigidly and irrevocably on a party without a 
hearing is obviously a harsh and oppressive thing . . . For 
that reason it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of 
discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there 
-10-
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is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's 
d "d " failure to appear and timely application is ma e to set asi e. 
Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 U.2d 52, 356 P.2d 951 at 
952 (1962). 
In a case where an attorney abandons his client or 
withdraws without notice and the client is consequently 
burdened with a judgment against him, this Court has held that 
it is an abuse of discretion not to set aside the judgment. 
The controlling case is Interstate Excavating v. Agla 
Development, 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980). In that case a defendant 
did not receive notice of the trial date from his attorney 
after the attorney's withdrawal from the case. Upon receipt 
of notice of the default judgment, the defendant, like Swapp, 
contacted new counsel who diligently sought to attack the 
default judgment. The Court stated that "where there is doubt 
about whether a default should be set aside, the doubt should 
be resolved in favor of doing so." 
Similar Utah Supreme Court holdings have been handed 
down in cases where default judgments have been entered due 
to the impropriety or misconduct of the defaulting party's 
attorney: See Blyth v. Fargo Co., v. Swenson, supra; Utah 
Commercial & Savings Bank v. Trumbo, supra; Airkem Intermountain: 
Inc., v. Parker, supra. 
In agreement with these Utah's decisions are the 
holdings of the highest appellate courts of a number of 
neighboring jurisdictions: 
-11-
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In the Arizona case of Treadway v. Meador, 103 Ariz. 
83, 436 P.2d 902 (1968), the Arizona Supreme Court held that 
the trial court abused its discretion in failing to set aside 
a judgment of dismissal entered for failure of parties to 
answer Interrogatories. Like Swapp, these parties had 
engaged an attorney and attempted to comply with the Court's 
directions, but theiretained attorney failed to file answers 
as requested. See also Hansen v. Willis, 8 Ariz. App. 175, 
444 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1968). 
In the California case of Buckert v. Briggs, supra, 
the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District held 
that where plaintiffs' attorney had no basis for his belief 
that plaintiffs had lost interest in their case and plaintiffs 
had assumed and had no reason not to bel~evethat their attorney 
would represent them, their attorney's failure to advise the 
plaintiffs of their trial, apparently pursuant to a preconceiv-
ed intention not to act in their behalf, constituted positive 
misconduct within the exception to the general rule that 
accident or mistake authorizing relief from a default judgment 
may not be predicated upon neglect of a party's attorney, 
whose negligence is imputed to his client. Therefore, the 
judgment was properly set aside. These plaintiffs, like 
corssclaimant-appellant Swapp, had reposed their trust in an 
attorney who had through positive misconduct abandoned his 
clients. The California Court did not deem such misconduct 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
as "neglect" which could be imputed to these plaintiffs. 
By the same token the misconduct of Swapp's attorney should 
not be imputed to Swapp. Abandonment without notice is 
according to the California Court of Appeals, positive mis-
conduct that falls within the "exception to the general rule 
that the negligence of an attorney may be imputed to his client. 
In the Colorado case of Coerber v. Rath, 435 P~2d 228 
(Colo., 1968), the Court held that where the primary cause of 
the defendant's failure to answer Interrogatories was the 
inexcusable neglect of their counsel in whom they had placed 
their confidence and wbiere the setting aside of the default 
judgment would not have unwarrantedly prejudiced the plaintiff, 
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside 
the default. 
In another Colorado case, St. Vrain Dev~lopment Co., 
v. F. & S. Development Co., supra, the Court held that where 
a party has not been guilty of negligence, a judgment against 
him may be set aside if it was obtained because of the 
negligence of his attorney, provided he has a good cause on 
the merits, substantial justice will be done and can be done 
without undue prejudice to the other party. 
In the Oklahoma case of Rogers v. Sheppard, 192 P.2d 
643 (Okl. 1948), the Court there held that the abandonment of 
a client's cause by his attorney, without the knowledge of 
the client, constituted "unavoidable casualty or misfortune," 
under a statute authorizing the Court to vacate a default 
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judgment and that a denial of the client's motion to set aside 
was a clear abuse of discretion. See also, Grayson v. Smith, 
165 P.2d 984 (Okl .. 1946); and Hart v. Pharaoh, 359 P.2d 1074 
(Okl. 1961). 
In the Hawaii case of Stafford v. Dickson, 374 P.2d 
665 (Ha., 1962), the Court held that where a defense attorney 
was permitted to withdraw on the day of the Pre-Trial Hearing 
and where the Court knew that the defendant had left the State 
and was not notified of the hearing or of the withdrawal of 
his attorney and a default judgment was entered against the 
defendant for his failure to appear for the Pre-Trial, the 
defendant was deprived of due process of law and the default 
judgment was declared void. 
Pursu~sive authority from other jurisdictions supports 
the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Interstate ~xcavating v. Agla 
Development, supra: where a party is defaulted and judgment 
is entered against him due to the misconduct of his attorney, 
the client is not to be faulted under the theory that the 
negligence of his attorney is imputable to the client; and 
that upon a showing that the client was without knowledge 
of his attorney's abandon and withdrawal a default judgment 
entered in such circumstances should be set aside in the 
interest of judgment. 
. -14-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT V 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
DENIED THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT ON GROUNDS THAT IT WAS NOT BROUGHT 
WITHIN THE THREE MONTH TIME LIMIT. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that: 
Upon motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
Court may, in the furtherance of justice, relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: 
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; ... or (7) Any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The Motion shall be made within a reasonable time, 
and for reasons (1), (2),(3), or (4), not more than 
three months after the Judgment, Order, or proceed-
ing was entered or taken. 
Swapp made his Motion to Set Aside the Default Judg-
ment on October 9, 1981, just three months and nine days 
after the Judgment was entered against him on July 1, 1981. 
Swapp missed the deadline for his Motion by nine days, and 
this happened because he did not learn of the Judgment against 
him until on or about September 20, 1981, as a result of 
Tanglewood's Execution against his wife's property. Swapp 
was not able to retain new counsel until on or about October 1, 
1981, and his new counsel were not able to obtain the copies 
of the pleadings in the case until sometime thereafter. The 
Motion to set aside was filed on October 9, 1981, along with 
new counsel's Notice of Appearance. 
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Because Swapp missed the three month deadline by 
nine days, Swapp (who had attempted diligently to defend him-
self in this lawsuit) had entered against him a Default Judg-
ment of over $80,000.00 and an Execution Sale has taken place 
in which Tanglewood has purchased both his home and his wife's 
property, valued at approximately $150,000.00, for the sum of 
$45,000.00. 
The trial court allowed this Default Judgment to 
stand in spite of these circumstances, on grounds that defen-
dant's Motion was barred by the three month time limit. 
Defendant Swapp argues that his Motion should have 
been granted under Rule 60(b)(7), on grounds that a Motion made 
under sub-paragraph (7) is not subject to the three month 
Fule, but may be made within a "reasonable time." Though 
defendant raised both the Rule 60(b)(l) ground of "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" as well as the 
Rule 60(b)(7) ground, it is clear from the record and the 
affidavits, that Swapp's former attorney was neither mistaken, 
inadvertent, surprised, or excusably negligent in his handling 
of Swapp's case. Steven D. Luster was involved in gross 
negligence, inexcusable neglect, impropriety, and misconduct 
that caused Swapp, in the words of the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court, "unavoidable casualty and misfortune" which was beyond 
the control of Swapp and which cannot justly be attributed 
to him as layman who reposed his confidence and trust in an 
attorney whom he assumed was representing him, but who had 
abandoned him without notice. 
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Clearly these facts require the application of 
Rule 60 (b) (7), for they are reasons "justifying the relief 
from the operation of the Judgment" which are not governed 
by the three month Rule. Swapp had no way of knowing; except 
from his attorney, about the developments taking place in his 
case. As soon as Swapp ·discovered the problem, he acted and 
his pre~ent attorneys acted with dispatch. If there is a 
circumstance in which relief from a Judgment is warranted and 
where a Motion for Setting Aside a Judgment should be exempted 
from the three month deadline under sub-paragraph (7) of 
Rule 60(b), then surely this is it. Just such a case as 
this must have been contemplated by those drafting the Rule's 
"reasonable time" language. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the circumstances of this case, where Swapp was 
virtually abandoned by his at'torney without notice and suffered 
therefor the entry of the Default Judgment against him on July 1 
1981, in a sum exceeding $80,000.00, a Motion to Set Aside the 
·nefault Judgment, brought three months and nine days later, 
should not have been denied by the Third Judicial District 
Court because that Motion was brought too late or because it 
was grounded upon "negligence" that is imputable to the client, 
but should have been granted on grounds that the Motion was 
predicated on circumstances evidencing, not "mistake, inadver-
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tence 1 surprise, or excusable neglect 1 " but rather "other 
reasons justifying relief from the operation of a Judgment" 
involving attorney misconduct and impropriety 1 which grounds 
will sustain a motion even after the Rule's three-month dead-
line 1 so long as it is brought within a "reasonable" time 
period. The Lower Court'·s failure to grant Swapp's Motion 
constitutes an abuse.of discretion remediable on appeal. 
For these reasons, the. Sup~eme Court of Utah should reverse 
the Order of the Third Judicial District Court, and grant 
the setting aside of the Default, declare void the Default 
Judgment, and further void any post-judgment proc-edings 
predicated thereon. See generally Jenkins v. Arnold,573 P.2d 
1013 (Kan. 1978). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED December 3 , 1981. 
------
JACK1'1AN & ASSOCIATES 
th 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem T 84057 225-1632 
Attorneys for Crossclaimant-Appellant 
Reid Swapp a/k/a Reid Swapp 
Construction Company 
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I hereby certify a true & correct copy of the foregoin 
was mailed to: 
PATRICIA M. LEITH 
JOHN A. SNOW 
Vancott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorneys for ·crossclaimant-Respondent 
Tanglewood SLC Associates 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
by depositing the same in the U.S. Main, postage prepaid, this 
}}.R_r~ 
s3 day 0 f -l\l evemhe r , 19 81. 
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